Abstract Using a bioeconomic model of a coral reef-mangrove-seagrass system, we 1 analyze the dynamic path of incentives to achieve an efficient transition to the steady state 2 levels of fish biomass and mangrove habitat conservation. Our model nests different types 3 of species habitat dependency and allows for changes in the extent of habitat to affect the 4 growth rate and the long-run fish level. We solve the two-control, two-state non-linear opti-5 mal control problem numerically and compute the input efficiency frontier characterizing the 6 tradeoff between mangrove habitat and fish population. After identifying the optimal locus 7 on the frontier, we determine the optimal transition path to the frontier from a set of initial 8 conditions to illustrate the necessary investments. Finally, we demonstrate how dynamic con-9 servation incentives (payments for ecosystem services) for a particular habitat with multiple 10 services are interdependent, change over time, and can be greater than contemporaneous 11 fishing profits when the ecosystem is degraded. 
1 Coastal development and conversion for aquaculture are two primary drivers of mangrove habitat loss (Lal 1990) . 
134
The model describes a biological (fish) species whose life-cycle spans coral reef, seagrass 135 bed and mangrove habitats as depicted in Fig. 2 . Adults are sedentary and subject to a fixed 136 rate of natural mortality (μ) and a time-varying rate of fishing pressure on a coral reef (h t ).
137
New individuals recruit to the reef either directly from seagrass beds or after an intermediate 138 nursery stage within mangroves.
139
In any period, the share of the juveniles produced from the adult, reef-based population
140
(N t ) is equal to J (N t ) = θ N γ t where γ and θ are non-negative. Egg production is often 141 thought to follow increasing returns to scale per individual and we can model this with the 142 assumption that γ is greater than one. The parameter θ could be modeled as a function of the 143 coverage and quality of the seagrass beds, but for simplicity we assume that it is a constant 144 parameter.
145
From the total amount of juveniles produced, a fraction goes from the seagrass beds (see also Arvedlund and Takemura (2006) . By focusing on the fraction of cover, we also put 169 aside the complexity of distinguishing between depth and perimeter coverage of mangroves.
170
In the Gulf of California, Aburto-Oropeza et al. (2008) found that the depth of the mangrove 171 habitat is less important for fisheries production than the coastal perimeter of habitat, because 172 most species remain within the edge area.
173
Putting the components together, recruitment to the reef at time t is equal to: occurs when survivorship of direct recruits to the reef, S r , is equal to zero. In this case, the 180 reef population is entirely dependent on recruits from the mangroves and if the mangroves 181 are completely removed, the population will go extinct.
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Following Armsworth (2002) , the density-dependent process is captured by recruits com- 
187
Combining recruitment, fishing and natural mortality, the instantaneous rate of change for 188 the fish stock on the reef is:
190
To illustrate how mangroves affect the long-run equilibrium level of the reef population,
191
we derive the analytical expression for the unexploited steady-state equilibrium of Eq. 2
192
as a function of the mangrove coverage. Under the assumption that γ is equal to one, the 193 equilibrium population is: habitat or a decrease in natural mortality increases the equilibrium population on the reef.
199
The change in the unexploited steady-state population with a change in M is equal to:
difference in the survivorship in the two habitats and the how an increase in mangrove cov-
203
erage affects the share of juveniles that utilize the habitat, everything else being equal.
204
The extent of mangroves connected (within a certain distance) to the reef depends on 205 whether the planner engages in restoration or clearing. The mechanism by which these activ-
206
ities translate into changes in mangrove coverage is described by a conversion production 207 function, F(D t ). The mangrove dynamics are has the following properties: 
Economic Model
225
Similar to Swallow (1990) and following the long tradition in bioeconomic modeling (Clark 226 1990), we model a benevolent social planner that can choose the level of mangrove conver-227 sion and fish catch in each period. In our most general formulation, controls are chosen to 228 maximize the net present value from fishing, development, and mangrove protection.
229
The infinite horizon optimal control problem of the planner is
5 Given that we rescaled M t to be a proportion of the maximum extent (pristine area), the rate of mangrove conversion, D t , is correspondingly scaled to be in the same units. 6 We are currently assuming that restored habitat is substitutable for pristine habitat. Most likely, the substitutability is not perfect, at least in the short run. We plan in future work to consider this possibility within the context of a specific place. 7 Another approach would be to include two control variables, one for restoration and one for development. While such a model might better capture the on-the-ground realities, it is unlikely to change the qualitative conclusions of our analysis. 
244
We model the benefits of development, B(1 − M t ), as a function of the amount of man-245 groves cleared (e.g. extent of total development which is 1 − M t in any t) rather than from the 246 flow of conversion (Swallow 1990 ). Our approach is consistent with the idea that developed 247 areas will return a flow of rents from some alternative use. We model the total cost of conver-
248
sion by a quadratic function, which is symmetric with respect to zero and has the following for either trying to ramp up restoration or development too quickly.
254
We also include the non-negativity restrictions on the states and control (fishing catch) 
276 fishery bioeconomic models that are characterized by singular controls (Clark 1990 ).
300
When D t is non-zero and the proportion of mangrove coverage is above zero and less 301 than one, the optimality condition for conversion (Eq. 9) shows that the shadow price on 302 mangroves is equal to the ratio of the marginal cost to the marginal product of conversion,
303
9 For a discussion of the complimentary slackness condition applied to Eqs. 14, 15, 16, see Chang (1992, p. 302 
319
where α is the choke price, β is the slope of the demand curve, and c is a cost parameter.
320
The per unit cost of harvest in Eq. 20 is a function of the fish stock-it depends inversely on 321 the fish population. Given that these habitats are often found in remote areas of developing 
Optimal Interior Steady-State
325
Following steps outlined in Kamien and Schwartz (1991), we derive the "Golden rule" equa-
326
tions for the optimal fish stock size and mangroves at the steady-state. We put aside for now 327 the possibility of corner solutions in the steady-state (e.g. all development, all mangroves,
328
and no fishing). We explicitly include the possible for corner solutions both in the transition 329 and at the steady-state in the numerical analysis. Specifically, the equations that correspond
330
to an interior steady-state solution are:
Marginal value of catching and selling another fish
Cost of catching another fish in terms of the reduced average productivity of the stock
Marginal benefits in the fishery ,
335
and the subscripts correspond to the derivatives of the functions with respect to the variables.
336
Recall that setting Eq. 12 to zero implies that the steady-state harvest level is equal to Eq. 23. storm protection values will result in less cleared mangroves.
344
Not surprisingly, the optimal fish stock on the reef follows the standard bioeconomic cap-345 ital-theoretic result (Clark 1990 ) where the social planner sets the optimal stock level such 346 that the (instantaneous) returns in perpetuity from harvesting another fish (instantaneously)
347
at the steady-state less the opportunity cost is equal to the rate of return of selling the fish 348 and investing the proceeds in capital markets. The opportunity cost is the (instantaneous) 349 reduction in the (average) productivity of the system weighted by the stock dependent costs 350 of fishing in perpetuity from taking out an additional unit of the stock forever.
351
Since the recruitment function depends on the nature of how species utilize habitat, the In this section, we explore the dynamics of how to get to the optimal steady-state when the 369 species has a facultative or obligate relationship with mangroves. We also consider the cases 370 where the planner does and does not take into account the storm protection benefits from 371 mangroves. In all of the cases, finding the dynamic path in Fig. 1 
401
In the numerical analysis we employ functional forms for mangrove conversion (F(D)), 11 Another potential solution technique is dynamic programming (DP) where we could use value function iteration to solve for the optimal solution (Judd 1998) . DP is an especially useful method when considering the role of stochasticity and decision-making under uncertainty. 12 We could also include a sluggish (or faster) response between conversion effort and mangrove stock dynamics by specifying
, where ξ is a response parameter. 13 The steady-state open-access levels are solved for by setting average fishing profits to zero and the dynamics of the fish stock to zero for a given level of mangroves. the solution of which corresponds to a point on the curve. We find that there are differences 433 in the trade-off curve (see Fig. 3 ) between the obligate and facultative setting. In the faculta- Note: The facultative case corresponds to the top row and the bottom row illustrates the obligate case. The column headings correspond to the vertical axes. In the first column, a dot represents the optimal steady-state levels. The optimal transition path for two initial conditions is presented: one condition corresponds to 125% of the steady-state levels of N and M (dotted line) and the other to 35% of the levels (dashed line). In columns two and three, the first 20 years of the transition paths are highlighted to show the differences across the cases. The insets illustrate the convergence to the steady-state solution that occurs within 50 time steps
After having identified the trade-off the curve, the question is: how do you go from the 439 current level (initial conditions) to the frontier and to which point on the frontier? In Fig. 3 440 we illustrate the optimal path for two initial conditions, where one condition corresponds to 441 125% of the steady-state levels of N and M and the other corresponds to 35% of the levels.
442
The latter represents the situation where the planner is engaging in rebuilding the fish and at a decreasing rate) from restoring the habitat via faster recovery rates of the population.
469
Eventually, however, the planner finds that it pays to divest in habitat and accrue the gains 470 from development. Overall, the magnitude of restoration is greater in the obligate setting,
471
which is being driven largely by the differences in the steady-state levels.
472
The optimal paths from a point where the fishery and mangrove are not overexploited are from storm protection as specified in Table 1 . As we found in case 1, the steady-state fish 480 stock levels are similar across the two obligate and facultative settings since the steady-states 481 reside on the upper (flatter) portion of the trade-off curve. We also find that the mangrove 482 steady-state is greater in the obligate setting (see Fig. 4 ).
483
Relative to the case with no storm protection, we find that the mangrove steady-state is 484 larger, which is not surprising since we included an additional value to the standing stock 485 in the objective function. Given the increase in extent of mangroves when in situ values are 486 incorporated, the fishery is also more productive. In this case, both the steady-state stock and 487 harvest levels are greater than when storm protection benefits are not included.
488 Figure 4 illustrates that the overshoot in the mangrove dynamics across the two cases is 489 still part of the optimal solution. In the obligate setting, a difference between the two cases is 490 that during the overshoot, the planner completely restores the mangroves (no mangroves are 491 developed) and maintains this level for a number of periods before redeveloping the habitat. 15
492
When we increase the adjustment costs of converting mangroves, we still find the overshoot 493 but whether it pays to restore all mangroves depends on the returns to storm protection and 494 fishing. We also find that a moratorium on fishing is not part of the optimal solution. The lack 495 of a moratorium is due both to the economic value in the system being more diverse than just 496 14 The temporary moratorium on fishing is dependent on the initial conditions and the economic and ecological characteristics of the fishery. For example, if we increase the initial fish population level (50% of the steady-state level instead of 35%), then the temporary moratorium is no longer part of the optimal solution (catches start low and increase over time but are always positive). Numerically, h * t is less than 1e-4 during the period we are labeling a temporary moratorium. 15 Recall that we are using storm protection as a mnemonic for potential in situ values. A natural question to ask is whether the value in storm protection is tied to the level of development/infrastructure of mangroves. We abstract away from this level of detail given the nature of the model and focus on qualitative insights. Applying these tools to a particular location would necessitate consideration of these interactions. The facultative case corresponds to the top row and the bottom row illustrates the obligate case. The column headings correspond to the vertical axes. In the first column, a dot represents the optimal steady-state levels. The optimal transition path for two initial conditions is presented: one condition corresponds to 125% of the steady-state levels of N and M (dotted line) and the other to 35% of the levels (dashed line). In columns two and three, the first 20 years of the transition paths are highlighted to show the differences across the cases. The insets illustrate the convergence to the steady-state solution that occurs within 50 time steps fishery returns and to the greater initial endowment of mangroves. As such, the planner can 497 afford to fish at the outset even though it slows rebuilding. 
Optimal Payments for Ecosystem Services
499
The dynamic paths and long-run steady states depicted in cases 1 and 2 are consistent with 500 a benevolent coastal planner. We now use the model to identify the payment for ecosystem 501 service (PES) schedule for mangroves that corresponds to the optimal trajectory. 16 Assuming 502 for the moment that there are no values from storm protection, Eqs. 11 and 22 illustrate a 503 potential optimal payment for ecosystem service (PES) mechanism by which either a coral-504 reef fishermen's cooperative (e.g., territorial user right (TURF)) or the government might 505 16 In order to focus on the PES for mangroves, we assume that the stock externality in the coral reef fishery has already been addressed either through the creation of a cooperative or some other form of catch share. This assumption allows us to put aside mechanism design issues with respect to PES systems, such as free riding incentives-issues that are important directions for future research.
provide via a subsidy to compensate coastal developers for the lost development benefits. 17
506
In particular, the payment for ecosystem services (per unit) provided by mangroves for the 507 provisioning of fish catch at time t is given by (assuming h * t > 0) 18 : Since PES depend on marginal benefits of M t to the fishery, which is determined by 540 the nature of the species-habitat relationship, we find that when the fish population is more 541 17 The direction of payments depends on the initial allocation of development rights; for illustrative purposes, we examine the case in which private landowners are endowed with these rights such that payments to forgo mangrove development flow from a fishermen's cooperative or the government to private landowners. 18 The condition that holds when 0 = h t * is
where recall π h ≤ λ t . 19 A lower insurance payment is one way that these values could be internalized by the developer. 20 The dynamics of the PES are similar for the other initial conditions, except that the PES starts below the long-run level and is increasing. 21 This result is sensitive to the assumption over whether private landowners internalize the storm protection benefits. If such in situ benefits are not internalized then the payments from the fishermen would be insufficient to induce the socially optimal solution of mangroves. case (see Figs. 3 and 4) . PES under the obligate case is, therefore, greater in the short run.
544
Finally, we observe that PES under obligate and facultative settings converge when there 545 are no storm protection benefits while in the alternative case they do not. This result depends 546 on the linearity (or nonlinearity) of benefits to development and to storm protection with 547 respect to M t . Since we have assumed linear benefits to development (see Table 1 
554
To put the magnitude of these payments in perspective, Fig. 5 panel B illustrates the differ-555 ence between fishing profits and the PES payment in each period t as a percentage of the PES 556 payment. 22 During the initial moratorium when the fish stock is rebuilding, fishing profits 557 are zero, but the PES payment is still positive (corresponds to a negative percentage in Fig. 5   558 panel B). The threshold time where fishing profits become greater than PES payments for the 559 obligate cases is less than two periods with storm protection and less than 10 periods without 560 storm protection. In general, the relative magnitudes of fishing profits and PES payments 561 depend on the ecological relationships and whether storm protection benefits are included.
562
Consistent with the actual payment amounts, we find that the fishing profits are significantly 563 greater than the PES payment when storm protection benefits are included (on the order of 564 300-400%).
565
PES payments greater than fishing profits during the rebuilding period highlights a poten-566 tial issue regarding self-financing that can arise when setting up PES mechanisms in degraded 567 ecosystems. That is, without access to capital either from government loans, subsidies, or 568 private sources, the ability of the fishing cooperative or group to pay the land developer to 569 restore mangroves is potentially in jeopardy. To our knowledge, this potential issue has not 570 been raised yet in the discussion of PES mechanisms. 
Sensitivity Analysis
572
The optimal ecosystem service payment depends on the ecological and economic parameters In this section, we undertake a sensitivity analysis on the some of the key parameters 585 and functional forms assumed in the base case to get a better picture of how the optimal 586 PES schedule depends on the ecological and economic context within which the services 587 are delivered. We continue to start from the initial conditions used to derive Fig. 5 , but the 588 optimal paths and steady-states will differ from the base case. 23 We alter both the baseline 
Seagrass Survivorship
600
Because we have found that there are potentially important interactions between services 601 in terms of the amount and timing of the optimal PES schedule, we hypothesize that there 602 must also be interdependencies across different habitats. This is especially likely when the 603 production chain of ecosystem services entails multiple habitats.
604
We find that indeed there is an effect on the relative sizes of fishing profits and PES pay-605 ments when we decrease the seagrass survivorship rate. We also find that the magnitude and 606 qualitative pattern of the effects depend on the other ecosystem services. In the case of no 607 storm protection, for example, the PES payment is greater than fishing profits for a longer 608 period of time and the PES is a larger share of fishing profits than in the base case. Without 609 storm protection, we find that there is a slower rate of restoration and a longer fishing mora- 
Mangrove Utilization
624
The assumption that the share of juveniles utilizing mangroves is linear (ω = 1) over M in the obligate setting, which is entirely dependent on the mangroves for recruits.
630
Beginning with the case of no storm protection, we find a divergence between the facul- 
Cost of Conversion
646
What is the impact on the relative values of fishing profits and PES payments when the cost 647 of conversion of mangroves is greater? In the steady-state, the incremental cost of conversion 648 does not affect the level of mangroves or fish stocks (since the marginal cost approaches zero 649 as D approaches zero) and therefore, any differences from the base case should be transitory.
650
When we increase the cost of conversion by 50%, we indeed find only a transitory effect 651 where the payment is larger to compensate developers for restoration activities (recall we are 652 starting at an initial condition with M t below its long-run steady-state). Not surprisingly then, When we decrease the slope of the demand curve (holding the vertical intercept constant) 660 the fishery is more profitable for a given level of harvest, everything else being equal. The 661 time to self-financed PES is shorter than in the base case for all settings (with or without 662 storm protection benefits; obligate or facultative species-habitat relationship). We also find 663 that in the obligate case without storm protection, the ratio of fishing profits to PES is about 664 1.59 in the steady-state. Because the PES is a smaller share of fishing profits, this ratio might 665 be more politically acceptable than those found in the previous analysis. We also find that 666 the initial length of the fishing moratorium is longer in all cases while the initial investment 667 in restoration is dependent on whether storm protection benefits are included. We also find 668 that the optimal steady-state level of mangroves is larger and the steady-state fish stock is 669 smaller in each of the cases. The planner, therefore, is trading-off investing in greater levels 670 of mangroves during the transition, which lead to a faster growth rate of the fish populations, 671 against a lower steady-state -stock of fish due to greater fishing pressure (and fishing profits). 
688
We illustrate in our model system that the qualitative nature of the path to the long-run 689 steady state is similar for the obligate and facultative settings, while the steady state level of 690 mangroves is (intuitively) greater in an obligate relationship. We show that the optimal path 691 can involve temporarily overshooting the long run mangrove stock. In the case of rebuilding, 692 for example, the overshoot is optimal, because additional mangroves speed up the rebuild-693 ing of fish stocks. The robustness of the optimal overshoot is an interesting area for future 694 research, especially when the assumption that restored habitat is immediately and equally 695 ecologically productive for the fishery is relaxed. Other interesting research questions include 696 measuring the costs of going to other (not optimal) points on the frontier and the economic-697 ecological differences in the transition to these non-optimal points.
698
Ultimately, we find that efficient PES incentives for habitat conservation depend critically 699 on the nature of the ecological and economic conditions where the services are provided and 700 demanded. Generally, the additional dynamic incentives will need to be equal to the marginal 701 benefit to the fishery, which includes current as well as future values. When private marginal 702 in situ values (e.g. storm protection) exist and are internalized, the necessary additional PES payment to account for the value of mangroves in the fishing sector is reduced. The political-704 economy implication of this finding is that by including multiple ecosystem services, each 705 stakeholder group that benefits from an ecosystem function with multiple services will likely 706 have lower outlays relative to the situation where fewer services are considered, everything 707 else being equal (at least in the case of synergistic ecosystem service provision).
708
We also find that for degraded systems that the PES payments can exceed contemporane-709 ous fishing profits. This result highlights a potential difficulty in instituting PES schemes in 710 the very places (degraded ecosystems) that likely need them the most. In particular, the PES 711 program would need to be coupled with access to capital to help finance the payments until 712 the value of the ecosystem services derived from the ecosystem function can pay for itself.
713
We also find that in some cases the PES payments comprise a significant share of the fishing 714 profits. Our analysis also shows that details that will likely affect the political adoption of 715 these schemes, such as how long until fishing profits are greater than PES payments and the 716 relative size of the payment, are dependent on the local ecological and economic conditions.
717
To illustrate the dynamic and interrelated nature of ecosystem service payments, we 718 abstract away from important mechanism design and governance issues, such as informa- 
